Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Lowell E. Potter v. Century 21 Mining, and OTC
Stock Transfer : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Ray Barrios, P.C..
Robert M. McDonald; McDonald, West and Benson; F. Keith Biesinger.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lowell E. Potter v. Century 21 Mining, OTC Stock Transfer, No. 930179 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5054

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LOWELL E. POTTER,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

v.
CENTURY 21 MINING, and
OTC STOCK TRANSFER,

Case No. 930179-CA

Defendants/Appellant.
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE HONORABLE RICHARD H. MOFFAT, PRESIDING

Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON
455 East 500 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Ray Barrios, P.C.
First American Title Building
330 East 400 South, #250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

F. Keith Biesinger
175 South Main, Suite 550
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

LIST OF PARTIES

L< Cen
OSC Stock Tranf er,
notice of appeal

a na r4

e f e n d a n I. w11 11<i:s 11 > t. I „i„ I e i ,1 a

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF PARTIES

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

...

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

12

ARGUMENT

14

POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING
CENTURY'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT ENTERED WHICH WAS WITHOUT NOTICE
TO CENTURY IN VIOLATION OF RULE 5(A),
U.R.C.P.

14

POINT II

18

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
CENTURY'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
JUDGMENT WAS UNTIMELY FILED
POINT III

23

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
CENTURY
HAD
NOT
DEMONSTRATED
THE
EXISTENCE OF MERITORIOUS DEFENSES

ii

POINT IV

26

THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING CENTURY'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
CONCLUSION

29

ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

31

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Aliva v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990)

1

Berrv v. Slaale, 431 P.2d 575 (Utah 1967)

3,24

Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989)

3

Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras. 359 P.2d 21
(Utah 1961)

2,3,19,26

Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688
(Utah 1985)

2,22

Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 240 Pac. 165
(Utah 1925)

3,24

Davis v. Heath Dev. Co.. 558 P.2d 594 (Utah 1976)
Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 785 P.2d 682
(Idaho App. 1990)
Dudley v. Keller. 521 P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974)

.

.

Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co..
236 Pac. 231 (Utah 1931)

3,25
26
2,3,22
3,26

Grayson Ropper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467
(Utah 1989)

2

Gribble v. Gribble. 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978)

....

1,18

Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 189
(Utah 1962)

2,22

Heloesen v. Inyanoumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981)
Hoggan & Hall & Higgins. Inc. v. Hall. 414 P.2d 89
(Utah 1966)
Interstate Excavating. Inc. v. Agla Dev. Corp..
611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980)
Jones Mining Company v. Cardiff Mining & Milling
Company. 191 Pac. 426 (Utah 1920)
iv

3,28,29
3,24,25
2,22
3,24

Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D. T. Southern
Properties. 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992)

2

Mendez v. State. 813 P.2d 1234 (Utah App. 1991)

. .

2,22

McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc..
411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966)

2,22

Nelson v. Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)
Nicholson v. Evans. 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982)

. . .

1,17

. . . 3,24,25

P & B Land. Inc. v. Klunaervick. 751 P.2d 274
(Utah App. 1988)
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp.. 614 P.2d 636

1,17

(Utah 1980)

3,24

Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984)

. . .

1,17

Scaharf v. BMG Corporation. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

. 2

Wells v. Children's Aid Society. 681 P.2d 199
(Utah 1984)
Workman v. Naale Construction Co., Inc.. 802 P.2d 749

1,18

(Utah App. 1990)

2,3,21,26
RULES

Rule 5(a), (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1,4,14,15,16

Rule 55(a), (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

1,4,15,16,17

Rule 56(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
7
Rule 58(A)(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . . 2,4,20,21
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
. . 2,4,13,18,
19,20,21
Rule 60(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
19
Rule 60(b)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure . .
13,19,21
STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k)
v

1

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
This is an appeal from a final Order dated January 15,
1993, wherein the lower court denied Defendant/Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment.
jurisdiction

This Court has

to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code

Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in denying Defendant/

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment that had been
entered without notice to Century?

In addressing the issue,

the Appellate Court will review the lower court's decision for
correctness and accord no particular deference to the decision
of the lower court. Aliva v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah 1990).
The authorities cited by Defendant /Appellant on this issue are
as follows:

Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule

55(a), (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Russell v. Martell,
681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunaervick,
751 P.2d 274 (Utah App. 1988); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d
1207 (Utah 1983); Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978);
Wells v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).
2.

Did

the

lower

court

err

in

concluding

that

Defendant/Appellant failed to timely file its Motion to Set
1

Aside

Default

Judgment?

In addressing

the

issue, the

Appellate Court will review the lower court's decision for
correctness and accord no particular deference to the decision
of the lower court.

Lincoln Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. D. T.

Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992).

The

authorities cited by Defendant/Appellant on this issue are as
follows:

Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule

58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Bish's Sheet Metal Co.
v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961); Blackhurst v. Transamerica
Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); Mendez v. State, 813 P.2d
1234 (Utah App. 1991); Workman v. Naale Construction, Inc.,
802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990) McKean v. Mountain View Memorial
Estates, Inc.. 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966); Dudley v. Keller, 521
P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974); Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377
P.2d 189 (Utah 1962); Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Aala Dev.
Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980).
3.

Did the lower court err in denying Defendant/

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment on grounds
that Defendant/Appellant had failed to present meritorious
defenses?

In addressing the issue, the Appellate Court will

review the lower court's decision for correctness and accord
no particular deference to the decision of the lower court.
Scaharf v. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985); Gravson
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Ropper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989).

The

authorities cited by Defendant/Appellant on this issue are as
follows: Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 240 Pac. 165
(Utah 1925); Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636
(Utah 1980); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982);
Hoaaan & Hall & Hiaains, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d 89 (Utah
1966); Berrv v. Slagle, 431 P.2d 575 (Utah 1967); Jones Mining
Company v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Company, 191 Pac. 426
(Utah 1920); Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558 P.2d 594 (Utah
1976); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 236
Pac. 231 (Utah 1931).
4.

Did the lower court abuse its discretion in denying

Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment?
If the lower court made no erroneous legal conclusions with
respect to construction of the Rules of Procedure or the legal
sufficiency of anticipated defenses (see cases cited above),
the lower court is afforded broad discretion and the Appellate
Court will reverse only for abuse of discretion.

Birch v.

Birch, 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1989). The authorities cited
by Defendant/Appellant on this issue are as follows: Workman
v. Naole Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990)
Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961);
Dudley v. Keller, 521 P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974) Heloesen v.
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Invanaumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981).

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Defendant/Appellant does not contend any authorities are
determinative of any issue involved in the appeal. However,
the following Rules of Procedure are central to the issues to
be considered by this appeal:

Rule 5(a), (b) U.R.C.P.

(attached as Addendum Exhibit "E"); Rule 55(a), (b) U.R.C.P.
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "F"); Rule 58A(d) U.R.C.P.
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "G"); and, Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P.
(attached as Addendum Exhibit "H").

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In

addressing

the

issues

raised

by

this

appeal,

Plaintiff/Appellee Lowell E. Potter will be referred to as
"Potter11 and Defendant/Appellant Century 21 Mining Company
will be referred to as "Century."
On or about September 13, 1988, Potter commenced this
action by the filing of a Verified Complaint.

(R. 2-6). In

Count III of the Complaint, Potter sought to enforce a
promissory note which he alleged was dated February 28, 1986,
in the principal sum of $90,000.

4

(R. 2-5). In Count IV of

the Complaint, Potter alleged that the Note "was to secure a
purchase price of five million (5,000,000) shares of Century
21 stock" and Potter sought recision of the Promissory Note
(R. 4). The other allegations of the Complaint have little
relevance to the issues involved on appeal.1
Century's prior attorney, Nathan Drage, was justifiably
confused as to the purpose for the commencement of the instant
action by reason of unorthodox procedures and the pendency of
previously filed litigation which asserted the same claim. In
an attempt to resolve the confusion, the matter was discussed
between counsel for Potter and Century, and Century's attorney
was informed that no further action would be taken in the
matter

without

further

notice.

In

reliance

on

this

representation, counsel for Century did not file an answer to
the Complaint.
On December 2, 1988, contrary to the prior representation
of Potter's attorney and without notice to Century or its
attorney, Potter obtained a Default Judgment against Century
(R. 21-22, Addendum Exhibit "B").

Thereafter, the existence

Count I of the Verified Complaint alleged that Defendant had wrongfully refused to honor stock
certificate 11391 issued by Century (R. 2-3). Count II asserted clains relating to such refusal. In this
regard, discovery in a subsequent case entitled "Lowell E. Potter, Plaintiff v. TV Communications Network, Inc.,
et al., Defendants" Civil No. 920905554, pending in the Third Judicial District Court, has established that
certificate 11391 was later submitted and honored by the transfer agent. Thus, the issues relating to Counts
I and II are now moot.

5

of the Judgment was not disclosed by Potter to Century or its
attorney.
When Century's prior attorney learned of the Judgment
from a third party in December, 1989, he filed a Motion to Set
Aside Judgment. On January 15, 1993, the lower court entered
an Order denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment (R. 94-95, Addendum Exhibit "D").

The Order of

January 15, 1993, denying Century's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment, is the subject of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
On March 18, 1987, Potter commenced an action against
Century alleging Century was "indebted" to Potter in the sum
of $110,000 (hereinafter "1987 action") (R. 43). On June 2,
1987,

Century filed an Answer to the Complaint in the 1987

action denying liability for the "indebtedness" (R. 44).
Apparently unwilling to subject his claims to the scrutiny of
litigation, Potter abandoned prosecution of the 1987 action.2
On September 13, 1988, while the 1987 action was still
pending, Potter commenced the instant action asserting the

On May 31, 1989, the 1987 action was dismissed for Lack of prosecution (R. 46).
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same claims that had been asserted in the 1987 action.3

On

the same date that the instant action was filed, Potter
obtained an Order to Show Cause requiring Defendants to appear
and show cause why the relief demanded in Count I of the
Complaint should not be granted. The Order to Show Cause was
originally prepared to reflect a hearing date in September,
but was apparently changed after execution by the Court to
show a hearing date of November 2, 1988 (R. 6).
The Order to Show Cause was the equivalent of a motion
for summary judgment with respect to Count I of the Verified
Complaint and was apparently characterized as an Order to Show
Cause in order to circumvent the 20-day restriction relating
to summary judgments filed by Plaintiffs imposed by Rule
56(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.4
Despite the fact the Complaint was filed on September 13,
1988,

and the Order to Show Cause entered on the same date,

the Complaint and Order to Show Cause were not delivered to

The Promissory Note which is the subject of the instant action was in existence on the date
of the filing of the 1987 action and the principal and accrued interest (18% per annum) on the date of the
filing of the Complaint in the 1987 action ($107,000) was approximately the same as the demand for relief stated
in the 1987 action ($110,000). Although the allegations of the 1987 action are brief and incomplete, it is
apparent that the demand for $3,000 in excess of principal and accrued interest was attributable to costs and/or
attorney's fees.
4
The original Order to Show Cause noted a hearing date in September, 1988 (R. 6 ) . The Order
to Show Cause was later changed by interlineation to November 2, 1988 (Ibid).

7

the sheriff for service on Century until October 20, 1988 (R.
8-9, 10-12) apparently to reduce Century's preparation time.
Service of the Complaint and Order to Show Cause was not
accomplished until October 24, 1988 (R. 8-9, 10-12). Service
was made on Leonard Nielson, registered agent for Century 21
(Ibid).

The registered agent mailed the Summons, Complaint

and Order to Show Cause to Century's attorney Ronald L. Vance
on October 28, 1988 (R. 48).
The documents were received by Ronald L. Vance and his
associate, Nathan Drage, on October 30, 1988 (Drage Affidavit,
para. 2, R. 50) only three days before the scheduled hearing
stated in the amended Order to Show Cause (Drage Affidavit,
para. 2, R. 50). Upon observing the unorthodox procedure, the
suspicious interlineation changes on the Order to Show Cause
and the inadequate Notice of Hearing on the dispositive
"motion,"

Drage immediately contacted the court clerk to

determine the legitimacy of the hearing date (Drage Affidavit,
para. 6, R. 51). Drage was informed by the clerk that no such
hearing had been scheduled on the court's calendar (Ibid).
Immediately after the telephone conversation with the
court clerk, Drage telephoned

Potter's attorney, Richard

Leedy, to express his confusion arising from the unorthodox
procedure, the interlineation change on the hearing date, the

8

absence of a hearing date on the court's calendar and the
purpose in filing the litigation in light of the pendency of
the 1987 action asserting the same claim.

At that time,

attorney Leedy informed Drage that Drage need not take any
further action in the matter without further notice (Drage
Affidavit, para, 7, R. 51).5
It was apparent that on and after Novemoer 1, 1988,
Potter's attorney, Richard Leedy, was fully aware that Ronald
Vance and/or his associate, Nathan Drage, had been engaged by
Century to defend the instant action as well as the 1987
action asserting the same indebtedness claim.6
On November 4, 1988, only three days after attorney Leedy
had represented that no further action would be taken without
notice to Drage, Leedy filed a Notice of Hearing stating that
hearing on the Order to Show Cause would be held on December
2, 1988 (R. 19). Contrary to the express representation made
to Drage only three days earlier, a copy of the Notice was not
sent or delivered to Century or its attorneys. The Mailing
Certificate on the Notice of Hearing made no mention of

In his Affidavit dated Hay 21, 1990, attorney Leedy did not deny his representation to attorney
Orage that no further action would be taken without further notice (Affidavit of Richard Leedy, para. 3, R. 7070A). Leedy merely stated he had "no independent recollection of the conversation and/or stipulation" (Ibid).

Ronald Vance filed an answer to the Complaint in the 1987 action on June 2, 1987 (R. 44).

9

Century or its attorney (R. 19) and Drage confirmed that he
received no notice of the hearing (Drage Affidavit, para. 11,
R. 52). On the date the Notice of Hearing was filed, Century
was not in default.

On the contrary, on the date of the

Notice of Hearing, the time permitted to answer the Complaint
had not yet expired.

Thus, Century was entitled to receive

notice of the hearing.
Inasmuch as Drage received no notice of the hearing
scheduled for December 2, 1988, the hearing proceeded without
participation

of

Century

or

its

attorney,

Nathan

Drage

(R. 21). During the course of the hearing, attorney Leedy, on
behalf of Potter, apparently noted Century's failure to answer
the Complaint and moved for entry of default judgment (R. 21).
There is disturbing evidence that Potter's counsel may have
represented to the court at the hearing that Century had
stipulated to the entry of a default judgment.

The Minute

Entry prepared by the court stated: "Based on Pltf's Motion to
Default Deft's and stipulation of respective counsel, the
court hereby grants the motions." (Emphasis added) (R. 20,
Addendum Exhibit "A").

The lower court granted Potter•s

motion and entered Century's default and ordered a default
judgment against Century in the sum of $90,000 together with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum and attorney's fees in
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the sum of $1,500 (Ibid).
After the entry of the Judgment, the existence of the
Judgment was concealed. At no time did Potter provide Century
notice of the entry of the judgment.7 Nathan Drage, attorney
for Century, first learned of the existence of the Judgment
from a third party in December, 1989 (Drage Affidavit, para.
11, R. 52).
After learning of the existence of the Judgment, attorney
Drage, on behalf of Century, filed a Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment (R. 23-24) with an accompanying Memorandum
(R. 26-41), supporting Affidavits (R. 50-52; 55; 58-60) and
other supporting documents.

(See R. 57).

The Memorandum and affidavits submitted by Century in
support

of

its

Motion

to

Set

Aside

Default

Judgment

established the existence of meritorious defenses.

Century

provided documentation showing clear evidence of self-dealing
and related failure of consideration for the Promissory Note.
In this regard, Potter and his son, Thomas Potter, constituted
two of the three members of Century's Board of Directors at
the time Century purportedly "approved" the $90,000 debt to
Potter.

The resolution purporting to approve Century's

The file contains no notice of entry of judgment as required by Rule 58A(d). U.R.C.P.
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obligation was signed only by Potter and his son (R. 57). The
third Board member's signature is conspicuously absent from
the resolution (Ibid).

Furthermore, the Promissory Note was

executed in consideration for the purchase of 5,000,000 shares
of Century stock held by Potter (Verified Complaint, para. 19,
R. 4; R. 57).

After receiving the Promissory Note, Potter

failed and refused to deliver the 5,000,000 shares of Century
stock

(R. 55, 30).

The transactions described

in the

resolution, Potter's involvement in voting on a resolution for
his own benefit and Potter's conduct after the resolution,
establish the existence of the defenses of breach of fiduciary
duties and failure of consideration.
On the basis of these facts, Century has justiciable
defenses

including

breach

of

fiduciary

duty;

lack

of

consideration; and, absence of valid corporate authorization
for the indebtedness.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I.

On November 4, 1988, Potter filed a notice of

a hearing to be held before the lower court on December 2,
1988.

On the date the notice was filed, the time permitted

for Century to file its answer to the Complaint had not yet
expired.

Thus, Century was not in default and entitled to

12

notice of all hearings.
attorney was

fully

Despite the fact that Potter's

aware of the

identity

of

Century's

registered agent and attorneys, Potter did not serve notice of
the hearing on Century or its attorneys and the hearing
proceeded in Century's absence.

During the course of the

hearing in the absence of Century and its attorney, Potter
obtained a default judgment against Century.
judgment

was

obtained

in violation

of

The default

the due process

procedures specified in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
which require notice of hearing in this circumstance.

The

lower court erred in refusing to set aside the default
judgment obtained in violation of due process procedures.
Point II.

Century's Motion To Set Aside Default was

based, in part, on Potter's failure to comply with the due
process procedures of adequate notice.

Such grounds fall

within the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7), U.R.C.P., which are
not subject to a three-month filing restriction.

The lower

court erred in denying Century's Motion To Set Aside Default
on the ground it was not filed within the three-month period.
On the basis of the facts and circumstances, including
Potter's abandonment of a prior action on the same claim and
concealment of the judgment in the instant case, Century's
Motion To Set Aside Default was timely filed.
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Point III. By reason of Potter's status as a director of
Century and his involvement in the corporate resolution
purporting to authorize Century's indebtedness to Potter, the
Promissory Note is void.

Furthermore, Potter failed to

deliver the consideration for the Promissory Note.

In such

circumstances, the lower court erred in concluding that
Century had not demonstrated the existence of meritorious
defenses.
Point IV. The default judgment was obtained on the basis
of representations on the part of Potter's attorney and other
actions expressly designed to induce Century's attorney to
delay filing an answer or otherwise defending against the
allegations of the Complaint.

In such circumstances, the

lower court abused its discretion by denying Century's Motion
To Set Aside Default Judgment thereby allowing Potter to
benefit by his deception and the violation of Century's
procedural rights.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING CENTURY'S MOTION TO
SET ASIDE A DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED WHICH WAS WITHOUT
NOTICE TO CENTURY IN VIOLATION OF RULE 5(a), U.R.C.P.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, on November 4, 1988,
Potter prepared and filed a Notice of Hearing to be held on

14

December 2, 1988. It is undisputed that Potter did not serve
a copy of the notice on Century or its attorney.8 During the
course of the hearing on December 2, 1988, the default
judgment was entered against Century.
On the date the Notice of Hearing was filed, Century had
not filed an answer to the Complaint.

However, on the date

the Notice of Hearing was filed, the time permitted for
answering the Complaint had not expired.9

Thus, Century was

entitled to notice of the hearing on December 2, 1988. Rule
5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
At no time prior to the hearing on December 2, 1988,
including the period after Century's answer became due, was
Century's default entered in accordance with Rule 55(a), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Thus, at all times prior to the

hearing on December 2, 1988, Century was entitled to notice of
all proceedings in the litigation. Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.10
o

The Notice of Hearing did not include Century or its attorney on the mailing certificate (R.
19) and attorney Drage confirmed the absence of notice (Drage Affidavit, para. 11, R. 52).

The Summons and Complaint were served on October 24, 1988 (R. 10-12). Thus, an answer was not
due until November 13, 1988, nine days after the Notice of Hearing was filed.

A litigant is released from an obligation to give opposing parties notice only "after the entry
of the default of any party, as provided in subdivision (a)(1) of this Rule ..." Rule 55(a)(2), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Century's default was not entered until December 2, 1988, immediately before entry of the
default judgment (R. 21).
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During the course of the scheduled hearing on December 2,
1988,

the

default

of

Defendant

was

first

simultaneously with entry of the default judgment.

entered
At all

times prior thereto, Century was entitled to notice of any
proceedings.

Rule 5(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule

55(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It is readily apparent
that if the required notice had been given, the default
judgment would not have been entered.

The notice would have

advised Century that Potter's counsel misrepresented his
intentions

and

had

reneged

on

the

stipulation

thereby

prompting Century to file an answer and otherwise protect its
interests.

Furthermore,

if

Potter's

counsel

falsely

represented

Century had stipulated to the default11, the

notice would have allowed Century to be present to deny the
existence of the stipulation.
At the time of the entry of the default judgment, the
court file clearly reflected that the Notice of Hearing had
been filed before Century's answer was due and that Century
had not received notice of the hearing.

Century's absence

from the hearing should have prompted some inquiry by the

11
As previously noted, the wording of the court's Minute Entry arising out of the December 2,
1988, hearing indicates Potter's attorney nay have represented to the court that Century had stipulated to the
default (R. 20, Appendix Exhibit "A").
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lower court as to the reason therefore.12
Parties in default retain some procedural rights as
stated in the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Russell v. Martell,

681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). It follows with greater force that
parties not in default under Rule 55(a) are entitled to the
procedural rights stated in the Rules of Procedure.
The failure of the lower court to demand compliance with
the procedural provisions of the Rules of Procedure compels
reversal of the judgment which was entered in violation of the
Rules.

P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunaervick, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah

App. 1988); Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984).
The failure of Potter to provide Century with Notice of
Hearing on December 2, 1988, goes beyond violation of the
Rules of Procedure.

The matter involves violation of basic

concepts of fairness and due process of law.

In Nelson v.

Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court
held:
Timely
and
adequate
notice
and
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful
way are the very heart of procedural
fairness . . . .

The lower court apparently failed to observe that the Notice of Hearing was filed prior to the
time Century's answer was due. In its Minute Entry, the court stated: "In this circumstance there is no
obligation under the rules or the statutes for a party taking the default to give notice thereof to the
opposition" (R. 91, Addendum, Exhibit "C").
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An elementary and fundamental requirement
of due process in any proceeding which is
to be accorded finality is notice
reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and
afford them an opportunity to present
their objections. The notice must be of
such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information, and it must afford
a reasonable time for those interested to
make their appearance.
Many cases have held that where notice is
ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party
of the nature of the proceedings against
him or not given sufficiently in advance
of the proceeding to permit preparation,
a party is deprived of due process.
Accord, Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64
(Utah 1978);
Wells v. Children's Aid
Society, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984).
By reason of the apparent intentional failure of Potter
to provide Century with notice of hearing wherein the default
judgment was entered, in clear violation of the Rules of Civil
Procedure and basic concepts of due process, the order of the
trial court should be reversed and the default judgment should
be set aside.
POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING CENTURY'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS UNTIMELY FILED
In its Minute Entry dated January 13, 1993, the lower
court considered Century's Rule 60(b) motion as based solely
on "excusable neglect" and denied the motion as untimely
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(R. 91, Addendum Exhibit "C").

In this regard, a motion under

Rule 60(b)(1) ("Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise and Excusable
Neglect") must be filed "not more than three months after the
judgment . . . was entered,"
The ruling by the lower court was clearly erroneous.
Century's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment was not limited
to excusable neglect.

On the contrary, paragraph 4 of the

Motion also asserted: "Counsel for Plaintiff took a default
judgment against Century 21 Mining without notice to Century
21 Mining or its counsel resulting in a lack of due process of
law."

(R. 24). The facts supporting this ground for vacating

the default judgment are considered in Point I, supra.
It is established

that a motion under Rule

60(b),

asserting failure of due process, falls within subdivision 7
of Rule 60, i.e., "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras,
359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961). Rule 60(b)(7) is not subject to the
three month time limitation imposed by the lower court. Thus,
the imposition of time constraints relating to "excusable
neglect" was erroneous and imposed time limitations upon
Century not stated in Rule 60(b).
Admittedly, Century's prior attorney did not file the
motion until February 26, 1990, more than 14 months after the
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judgment was entered. However, under the circumstances of the
case, it is respectfully submitted that such delay was not
unreasonable.

It is undisputed that counsel for Potter

expressly represented to Century's prior counsel that no
further action would be taken in the matter without further
notice.

In this regard, the continued absence of any further

notice for an extended period, including a period of 14
months, was not an unusual circumstance in this case. On the
contrary, in the 1987 action Potter took no action on the same
claim for a period of 26 months.13
Potter's involvement in Century's delay in filing its
Rule 60(b) motion is not limited to the false representation
of Potter's counsel and Potter's established practice of
abandoning the claim after it was filed. In addition to these
factors, Potter failed to comply with the provisions of Rule
58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide:
The prevailing party shall promptly give
notice of the signing or entry of
judgment to all other parties and shall
file proof of service of such notice with
the clerk of the court. However, the
time for filing a notice of appeal is not
affected by the notice requirement of
this provision.

The 1987 action was commenced on March 18, 1987 (R. 43) and was dismissed for failure to
prosecute on May 31, 1989 (R. 46), a period of 26 months.
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Century's failure to file its Motion under Rule 60(b)(7)
for a period

of

14 months is not unreasonable

in the

circumstances of this case. In Workman v. Naale Construction,
Inc. , 802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), this Court held that a
delay of more than one year in filing a motion under Rule
60(b)(5)-(7) was not unreasonable where the plaintiff had
failed to give notice of the entry of the judgment pursuant to
Rule 58A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It follows with

greater force that failure of both pre-judgment and postjudgement notice excuses delay in filing a motion under Rule
60(b)(7).
If anything is established by the record, it is that
Potter was the primary force in inducing Century's delay in
filing its motion under Rule 60(b).

The combined effect of

the false representation that no further action would be taken
without notice; the failure to serve notice of the hearing on
December 2, 1989; the prior abandonment of the same claim in
the 1987 action; and, the failure to give notice of the
judgment pursuant to Rule 58A(d) should be weighed against
Century's only contribution to the delay, i.e., continuing
good faith reliance on the representation and stipulation of
Potter's attorney.
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In such circumstance, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
should be imposed by the Court to prevent

Potter

from

benefitting from the misrepresentations of his attorney and
delay which he induced. Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985); Mendez v. State, 813 P.2d 1234 (Utah
App. 1991).
To the extent that Century's prior attorney's delay is
deemed unreasonable, Century should not be subjected to an
unjust judgment to which it has meritorious defenses merely by
reason of the neglect of its attorney to whom it entrusted to
represent its interests in the matter.

McKean v. Mountain

View Memorial Estates, Inc.. 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 1966).; Dudley
v. Keller, 521 P.2d 175 (Colo.App. 1974).

Moreover, default

judgments are not favored by the courts and are not in the
interest of justice and fair play.
Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189 (Utah 1962).

Heathman v. Fabian &
Any doubt as to the

reasonableness of the filing should be resolved in favor of
setting aside the default judgment.

Interstate Excavating,

Inc. v. Aala Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980).
On the basis of the foregoing, the order of the lower
court denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
should be reversed.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING CENTURY HAD NOT
DEMONSTRATED THE EXISTENCE OF MERITORIOUS DEFENSES
In its Minute Entry of January 13, 1993, one of the
stated grounds for denying Century's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment was that Century had not shown that it had
meritorious defenses (R. 91, Addendum Exhibit "C").
This ruling by the lower court was clearly erroneous. In
this regard, attached to Century's memorandum filed in support
of its Motion, was a copy of the Minutes of the Board of
Directors purporting to approve the $90,000 indebtedness of
Century in favor of Potter (R. 57) (hereinafter "Minutes").
The Minutes establish that at the time of the corporate
"authorization" for the $90,000 indebtedness, Potter and his
son, Thomas Potter, comprised two of the three members of
Century's Board of Directors. Thus, there was obvious selfdealing and serious questions of breach of fiduciary duties.
The Minutes involved a "special Board of Directors
meeting" conducted in the absence of the third director, John
L. Anderson. Mr. Anderson was the only director that did not
have a personal interest in the matter. Although the Minutes
recite that notice of the meeting was waived, John L. Anderson
did not sign the Minutes and no signed waiver of notice has
ever been produced. Anderson has confirmed to Century that he
23

received no notice of the meeting (R. 59). Furthermore, the
Minutes expressly acknowledge the obvious conflict of interest
which was openly ignored by Potter's participation in the
self-serving "authorization" for indebtedness in his favor at
the expense of the corporation.
The

Promissory

Note

was

executed

by

Century

as

consideration for the purchase*of 5,000,000 shares of Century
stock.14 (Verified Complaint, para. 19, R. 4; R. 57). After
receiving the Promissory Note, Potter refused to deliver the
5,000,000 shares (R. 55, 30).
These

circumstances

meritorious defenses.

demonstrate

the

existence

of

In this regard, the absence of notice

to all directors of a special meeting of the Board renders the
Board action void. Boston Acme Mines Dev. Co. v. Clawson, 240
Pac. 165 (Utah 1925). Furthermore, a director has a fiduciary
duty to the corporation.

Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp..

614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727
(Utah 1982); Hoaaan & Hall & Hiaains, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d
89 (Utah 1966); Berrv v. Slaale. 431 P.2d 575 (Utah 1967);
Jones Mining Company v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Company, 191
Pac. 426 (Utah 1920).

This duty requires the director to

It was contemplated that the stock would be received by Century as treasury stock and
thereafter delivered to Raymond Naylor as consideration for the purchase of a mining property (R. 55).
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subordinate his personal interests to the interests of the
corporation.

Nicholson v. Evans, 642 P.2d 727 (Utah 1982);

Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 414 P.2d 89 (Utah
1966).
Of greatest significance is the fact that Potter's
participation

in the corporate

resolution

purporting

to

authorize Century's execution of the Promissory Note renders
the Promissory Note void.

In Davis v. Heath Dev. Co., 558

P.2d 594 (Utah 1976), the Supreme Court held:
. . . Any director who has an interest in
a
proposed
transaction
with
the
corporation cannot participate in such
business to bind the corporation, either
to make up a quorum, or to vote on the
proposal. . . . The well established rule
is that in such circumstances, where its
officers deal with the corporation in
their own interest, that as to them the
contract is void, or at best voidable at
the option of the corporation.
The transactions described in the Minutes further suggest
a failure of consideration, i.e., Potter obtained a receivable
of $90,000 for 5,000,000 shares of his stock and then received
4,800,000

shares

in

addition

to

the

$90,000

(R. 57).

Thereafter, Potter refused to deliver the 5,000,000 shares
that gave rise to the execution of the Promissory Note (R. 55,
30).
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A corporate director has the burden to establish good
faith in his dealings with the corporation. Glen Allen Mining
Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 236 Pac. 231 (Utah 1931).
Under

the

circumstances

noted

herein, Potter

should

be

compelled to demonstrate his good faith at a trial on the
merits.
On the basis of the facts above described, it is
respectfully
concluding

submitted
that

Century

that
had

the

lower

failed

to

court

erred

demonstrate

in
the

existence of meritorious defenses. For this reason, the order
of the lower court denying Century's Motion to Set Aside
Default Judgment should be reversed.
POINT IV.
THE LOWER COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
CENTURY^ MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Century respectfully submits that by reason of the errors
in law noted in Points I - III, the issue of abuse of
discretion is moot. See Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc.,
802 P.2d 749 (Utah App. 1990); Bish's Sheet Metal Company v.
Luras, 359 P.2d 21 (Utah 1961); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v.
Smith, 785 P.2d 682 (Idaho App. 1990).

However, if the Court

determines that the discretion of the lower court should be
reviewed in this matter, Century submits that the facts and
circumstances of this case compel the conclusion that the
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lower court abused its discretion in denying Century's Motion
to Set Aside Default Judgment.
As
Potter's

noted

in

this brief, the misrepresentations

attorney was

a

controlling

factor

in

of

inducing

Century's counsel to refrain from timely filing an appropriate
response to the Complaint.

Century's attorney's continued

reliance upon the representations of Potter' s attorney was not
unreasonable in light of Potter's prior abandonment of the
same claim in the 1987 action which extended for a period of
26 months.
The default judgment was the direct consequence of an
apparent deliberate attempt to deprive Century of notice of
the hearing wherein the default judgment was entered.

The

failure of such notice constituted a clear violation of the
due process procedure specified in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The suspicious circumstances under which the indebtedness
to

Potter

arose

and

Potter's

failure

to

deliver

the

consideration for the Promissory Note (noted in Point III),
provided Potter with a compelling incentive to avoid scrutiny
as to the legitimacy and enforceability of the indebtedness
which he claimed was owing to him by Century.

The record

before the lower court demonstrated that Potter intended to
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use every means ranging from fraudulent misrepresentations to
blatant

violations

scrutiny.

of

procedural

rights

to

avoid

such

In this regard, when Century filed its answer in

the 1987 litigation, thereby subjecting Potter's claims to the
possibility of scrutiny in the litigation process, Potter
abandoned further prosecution taking no action for a period of
26 months.

When the instant litigation was commenced, all

efforts were focused on preventing the filing of an answer and
avoiding any procedure which would result in any investigation
or scrutiny of Potter's claims.
Potter

should

not be permitted

to benefit

by

the

deception and violation of procedural rules that pervade every
aspect of this case.
It has been held that where a plaintiff is fully aware
that defendant intends to appear and defend the action15; the
identity of defendant' s representatives are known to plaintiff
through communications regarding the issues in the action, an
extension to answer has been implied by said communications;
and, plaintiff thereafter takes a default judgment without
notice to plaintiff or his representatives, it is an abuse of
discretion to deny defendant' s motion to set aside the default

This fact is established not only by attorney Drage's telephone communication with opposing
counsel shortly after service of summons in the instant action (Drage Affidavit, para. 7, R. 51), but also by
the filing of an answer denying the same claim in the 1987 action by Drage's associate, Ronald Vance (R. 44).
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judgment. Helaesen v. Invanaumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981).
It is respectfully submitted that the circumstances involved
in the instant case, where an express agreement

for an

extension to answer was knowingly breached, the holding of the
Helaesen case applies with greater force.
The order denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default
Judgment clearly extends these unjust benefits to Potter and
thereby constitutes an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the order of the lower
court denying Century's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
should be reversed and the case remanded to the lower court
for a trial on the merits.
DATED this

K

day of
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

POTTER, LOWELL

CASE NUMBER 880905981 CV
PLAINTIFF
DATE 12/02/88
HONORABLE RICHARD H MOFFAT
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK WWD

VS
CENTURY 21
OTC STOCK TRANSFER
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:

DEFENDANT
MOTION HEARING

P. ATTY. RICHARD J LEEDY
D. ATTY. 0 ROBERT MEREDITH

BASED ON PLTF'S MOTION TO DEFAULT DEFT'S AND STIPULATION OF
RESPECTIVE COUNSEL, THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS THE MOTION
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake Countv Utah

Richard J. Leedy
Attorney for Plaintiff
245 Vine Street, No. 302
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 359-1767

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LOWELL C. POTTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

JUDGMENT

CivU N o M - O ^ I

CENTURY 21,
Judge Richard Moffat
Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing on the 2nd day of
December, 1988;

it appearing that process was duly served on

Defendant Century 21 and that more than 20 days have elapsed
since the service of the Summons and the Verified Complaint; the
Plaintiff moved for the entry of Default against the Defendant
Century 21 and requested Judgment in accordance with the prayer
of the Complaint; the Court entered the Default of the Defendant
Century 21 and ordered Judgment as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant Century 21 and
its agent OTC Stock Transfer, acknowledge the two million shares
of its common stock represented by Certificate No. 11391 and they
are to transfer the same without restriction in accordance with
Plaintiff's request.
It is further ordered that the Plaintiff have Judgment
against Century 21 for the sum of $90,000 together with interest

OOOOCi

at the rate of 18% per annum from February 28, 1986, and attorney
fees in the amount of $1,500.
DATED this

/5~

day of December, 1988.
BY THE CQ0RT

ftfhard

Moffat
.iTTES'l

Deputy CierK

' .' > ' \! W ~~ ' »
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Lowell Potter,
Plaintiff,

:

:
vs.
:
:
Century 21 Mining and OTC Stock Transfer, :
Defendants.

MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NO: 880905981 CV
JUDGE RICHARD H. MOFFAT

The Court having considered the Motion of the defendant Century 21 Mining, to set aside
the Default Judgment and the memorandum and other pleadings in support and in opposition
thereto and now being fully advised in the premises makes this its:
MINUTE ENTRY
The Motion is denied.

The basis, inter alia, is as set forth in the plaintiffs

Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendant's Motion. In particular even assuming as is
argued, but in the Court's opinion not demonstrated, that the judgment was entered through
excusable neglect on the part of Counsel for the defendant in order to prevail herein the
defendant must also file it's Motion to Set Aside in a timely fashion and show that it has a
meritorious defense. In the Court's opinion neither of the two latter requirements have been
met. It stretches the Court's imagination to think that a fifteen (15) month period from the date
of entry of the judgment until a Motion to Set Aside is filed can be deemed to be timely. In this
circumstance there is no obligation under the rules or the statutes for the party taking the default
to give notice thereof to the opposition. If in fact the parties had been negotiating as the

000091

POTTER V. CENTURY 21

PAGE 2

MINUTE ENTRY

defendant claims when a fifteen (15) month hiatus occurs it would seem that the prudent thing
to do would be to check the file in the clerk's office. Even a simple inquiry of opposing
Counsel would have elicited a response that the default had been taken. More importantly, no
meritorious defense was filed with the Motion to Set Aside the Default and any later filing such
as was done herein on April 4, 1991 only occurred because the previously filed memorandum
by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant's Motion pointed out the defect. Under the
circumstances the Court concludes that there is not sufficient basis to grant the defendant's
Motion to Set Aside the Default and the same is therefore denied.
Counsel for the plaintiff will prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this

/<

day of January, 1993.

S

RTchirtfH. Moffat
District Court Judge
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MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Minute Entry,
postage prepaid, to the following on this

•,-"

day of January, 1993.

J. Ray Barrios
Attorney for Plaintiff
First American Title Building
330 East 400 South, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Nathan W. Drage
Attorney for Defendant
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

Nathan W. Drage
Attorney for Defendant
2445 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116

c:> - *
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"r.ird Juoiciai District

JAN 1 5 1993
S.-\:.TLAKE COUNTY,

A/ •''.'••-rr i\f,\
J Deyuty'Cierk

J. RAY BARRIOS, P.C. (A3915)
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE BUILDING
330 East 400 South, Suite 250

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 322-3762
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LOWELL POTTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CENTURY 21 MINING, and
OTC STOCK TRANSFER,

]
;1
>
]

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT

I
]
|

Civil No. 880905981 CV
Judge Richard H. Moffat

Defendant.
The Court, having reviewed Defendant's Motion To Set Aside
Default Judgment and memorandum in support thereof in the above
captioned case, and having reviewed the Plaintiff#s Opposition to
said Motion and supporting memorandum, and the matter having
properly come before the Court pursuant to the Code of Judicial
Administration, Rule 4-501(1)(d); and the Court having found that
the

Defendant has neither filed it#s motion timely nor presented

a meritorious defense, and being fully advised in the premises,it
is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that there is not sufficient
basis to grant Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment
1.

Ol;0094

and the Defendant's Motion To Set Aside Default Judgment is

denied.
Dated this &

-JF~*
day of January, 1993.
BY THELG01

District Court
rt^Judge
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UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

by amendment, to be served any time before
trial; otherwise, the plaintiff in an action
would be virtually foreclosed from adding additional defendants after three months. Valley
Asphalt, Inc. v. Eldon J. Stubbs Constr., Inc.,
714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986).
—Untimeliness.
Where a summons was dated 38 days later
than a complaint was filed, but was not placed
in the hands of a qualified person for service
until seven months after the complaint was
filed, the summons was not timely issued.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. Dietrich, 25
Utah 2d 65, 475 P.2d 1005 (1970).
Amended complaint.
In wrongful death action filed November 15.
1973 with no summons issued, filing of
amended complaint on November 8, 1974 did

Rule 5

not recommence action, but amended complaint related back to time of original one by
virtue of Rule 15(c); therefore, since summons
did not issue within three months of filing o(
complaint, action was dismissed. Cook v.
Starkey, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976).
Waiver.
If a party appears in court, counterclaims,
and is partially successful, the party may not
claim untimely service under Subdivision (b).
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 Utah 2d 102, 417
P.2d 118 (1966).
Cited in State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of
Social Servs. v. Santiago, 590 P.2d 335 (Utah
1979); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1053 (Utah
1987); Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Schultz v. Conger, 755
P.2d 165 (Utah 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review, — Graham v. Sawaya:
Civil liability of one making false or frauduUtah's Notice Requirements for In Personam lent return of process, 31 A.L.R.3d 1393.
Construction of phrase "usual place of
Actions, 1982 Utah L. Rev. 657.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi- abode,'* or similar terms referring to abode,
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1988 residence, or domicil, as used in statutes relating to service of process, 32 A.L.R.3d 112.
Utah L. Rev. 153.
Airplane or other aircraft as "motor vehicle"
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Civil Procedure, 1989 Utah L. or the like within statute providing for constructive or substituted service of process on
Rev. 166.
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- nonresident motorist, 36 A.L.R.3d 1387.
Sunday or holiday, validity of service of sumable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for
In Personam Default Judgement in Utah: Gra- mons or complaint on, 63 A.L.R.3d 423.
In personam jurisdiction under long-arm
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations statute of nonresident banking institution, 9
S 2192 et seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Cor- A.L.R.4th 661.
In personam or territorial jurisdiction of
porations, Counties and Other Political Subdivisions, § 854; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process § 1 et state court in connection with obscenity proseseq.; 68 Am. Jur. 2d Schools $ 21; 72 Am. Jur. cution of author, actor, photographer, publisher, distributor, or other party whose acts
2d States, Territories, and Dependencies
were performed outside the state, 16 A.L.R.4th
$ 126.
1318.
C.J.S. — 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 1305 et
Forum state's jurisdiction over nonresident
seq.; 20 C.J.S. Counties § 263; 64 C.J.S. Mu- defendant in action based on obscene or threatnicipal Corporations § 2205; 72 CJ.S. Process ening telephone call from out of state, 37
§ 26 et seq.; 79 C.J.S. Schools and School Dis- A.L.R.4th 852.
tricts $ 436; 81 C.J.S. States § 226.
Necessity and permissibility of raising claim
A.L.R. — Mistake or error in middle initial for abuse of process by reply or counterclaim in
or middle name of party as vitiating or invali- same proceeding in which abuse occurred —
dating civil process, summons, or the like, 6 state cases, 82 A.L.R.4th 1115.
A.L.R.3d 1179.
Key Numbers. — Corporations *» 507;
Attorney representing foreign corporation in Counties *» 219; Municipal Corporations «»
litigation as its agent for service of process in 1029; Process «=> 21, 23, 24, 50 to 58, 63, 64, 82,
unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 A.L.R.3d 84 to 111, 127 to 153; 161 to 165; Schools and
738.
School Districts «=» 119; States «=» 204.

Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and other papers.
(a) Service: When required. Except as otherwise provided in these rules,
every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading subsequent to
the original complaint unless the court otherwise orders because of numerous
defendants, every paper relating to discovery required to be served upon a
party unless the court otherwise orders, every written motion other than one
which may be heard ex parte, and every written notice, appearance, demand,
offer of judgment, notice of signing or entry of judgment under Rule 58A(d),
and similar paper shall be served upon each of the parties. No service need be
made on parties in default for failure to appear except as provided in Rule
55(a)(2) (default proceedings) or pleadings asserting new or additional claims

Rule 5
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for relief against them which shall be served upon them in the manner provided for service of summons in Rule 4.
In an action begun by seizure of property, whether through arrest, attachment, garnishment or similar process, in which no person need be or is named
as defendant, any service required to be made prior to the filing of an answer,
claim or appearance shall be made upon the person having custody or possession of the property at the time of its seizure.
(b) Service: How made.
(1) Whenever under these rules service is required or permitted to be
made upon a party represented by an attorney the service shall be made
upon the attorney unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the
court. Service upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made by delivering a copy to him or by mailing it to him at his known address or, if no
address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court. Delivery of a
copy within this rule means: Handing it to the attorney or to the party; or
leaving it at his office with his clerk or other person in charge thereof; or,
if there is no one in charge, leaving it in a conspicuous place therein; or, if
the office is closed or the person to be served has no office, leaving it at his
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age
and discretion then residing therein. Service by mail is complete upon
mailing.
(2) A resident attorney, on whom pleadings and other papers may be
served, shall be associated as attorney of record with any foreign attorney
practicing in any of the courts of this state.
(c) Service: Numerous defendants. In any action in which there are unusually large numbers of defendants, the court, upon motion or of its own
initiative, may order that service of the pleadings of the defendants and replies thereto need not be made as between the defendants and that any crossclaim, counterclaim, or matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense contained therein shall be deemed to be denied or avoided by all other
parties and that the filing of any such pleading and service thereof upon the
plaintiff constitutes due notice of it to the parties. A copy of every such order
shall be served upon the parties in such manner and form as the court directs.
(d) Filing. All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a
party shall be filed with the court either before service or within a reasonable
time thereafter, but the court may upon motion of a party or on its own
initiative order that depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on
order of the court or for use in the proceeding.
(e) Filing with the court defined. The filing of pleadings and other papers
with the court as required by these rules shall be made by filing them with
the clerk of the court, except that the judge may permit the papers to be filed
with him, in which event he shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith
transmit them to the office of the clerk, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 5td) is
amended to give the trial court the option, either on an ad hoc basis or by local rule, of ordering that discovery papers, depositions, written interrogatories, document requests, requests for admission, and answers and responses need not be filed unless required for
specific use in the case. The committee is of the
view that a local rule of the district courts on
the subject should be encouraged.

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substantially similar to Rule 5, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — How civil action commenced, U.R.C.P. 3(a).
Service by mail, additional time after,
U.R.C.P. 6(e).
Third-party practice, U.R.C.P. 14.
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500 P.~d 550 <Utah L979); Myers v. Morgan,
626 P-2d 410 (Utah 1981); Bernard v.
Attebury. 629 P.2d 892 (Utah 1981); Bailey v.
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 19*84);
GMAC V. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243 (Utah 1986);
Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986);
Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986);
Tebbs. Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 735 P.2d
1305 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce. 732 P.2d 92
(Utah 1986); Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank,
738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987); Crosiand v. Peck,
738 P.2d 631 (Utah 1987); Elder v. Triax Co.,
740 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1987); Mascaro v. Davis,
741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Payne ex rel. Payne
v. Mvers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); McKee v.
Williams. 741 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah
1987); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct.

Rule 55

App. 1987); Kathy's Food Stores, Inc. v. Equitable Life & Cas.'lns. Co., 753 P.2d 501 (Utah
1988); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill.
762 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wade v. Burke. 800 P.2d
1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); City Consumer
Serv., Inc. v. Peters. 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991);
Cornish Town v. Kolier, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah
1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co.,
818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); Peterson v. Peterson,
818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Quinn v.
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992);
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d
858 (Utah 1992); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex rel. D.H. v. West
Vallev Citv, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexamination?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and
Error § 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs
§§ 14, 26 to 36, 87 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 1.
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 46 to
166; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 1.
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for
expenses incurred in relation to services for client. 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.L.R.4th 256.
Effect on compensation of architect or building contractor of express provision in private
building contract limiting the cost of the building, 20 A.L.R.3d 778.
Recoverability under property insurance or
insurance against liability for property damage of insured's expenses to prevent or mitigate damages, 33 A.L.R.3d 1262.
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling defendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as
"prevailing partv" or "successful party," 66
A.L.R.3d 1087.
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing
party" for purposes of awarding costs where
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66
A.L.R.3d 1115.
Continuance of civil case as conditioned
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144.

Running of interest on judgment where both
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099.
Allocation of defense costs between primary
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th
107.
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or
other sanctions against attorney who fails to
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial. 29
A.L.R.4th 160.
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457.
Retrospective application and effect of state
statute or rule allowing interest or changing
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41
A.L.R.4th 694.
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825.
Modern status of state court rules governing
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80
A.L.R.4th 707.
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R.
Fed. 168.
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514.
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=> 24 to
135; Costs <*=» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.;
Judgment *=» 1.

Rule 55. Default.
(a) Default.
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his
default.
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be necessary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the
nondefaulting party.

(b) J u d g m e n t . Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain,
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publication or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is
not an infant or incompetent person.
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter,
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems
necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff,
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule
54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief
by evidence satisfactory to the court.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 55, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Damages.
Divorce action.
Failure to plead.
Judgment.
—Conduct of counsel.
—Default entry necessary.
—Failure to follow rule.
—Hearing on merits.
—Punitive damages.
Notice.
Setting aside default.
—Collateral attack.
—Direct attack.
—Discretion of court.
—Grounds.
Excusable neglect.
—Judicial attitude.
—Movant's duty.
—Setting aside proper.
Time for appeal.
Cited.
Damages.
A default judgment establishes, as a matter
of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as
to each cause of action alleged in the complaint. Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon
the nondefaulting party to establish by competent evidence the amount of recoverable damages and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
There is no right to a jury trial on the issue
of damages once default has been entered.
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Divorce action.
Defendant who failed to file answer in divorce action was not entitled to hearing or notice before entry of default divorce decree even
though 90-day statutory period had not
elapsed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1975).
Failure to plead.
In an action for modification of the custody
provision in a divorce decree, it was appropriate for the trial court to rule on appellee's petition, absent any responsive pleading, and to
accept the allegations in the petition as true in
resolving the threshold requirement of
whether appellant's circumstances had materially changed; however, it does not follow that
appellee's petition entitled her to relief. A trial
court asked to render a judgment by default
must first conclude that the uncontroverted allegations of an applicant's petition are, on their
face, legally sufficient to establish a valid
claim against the defaulting party. Stevens v.
Collard, 180 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Ct. App.
1992).
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State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County,
780 P.2d 813 (Utah 1989); Donahue v. Durfee,
780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Territorial
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989); G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v.
Durbano, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989); Yoho
Automotive. Inc. v. Shillington, 784 P.2d 1253
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d
414 (Utah 1990); Butterfield ex rel. Butterfield
v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co.. 790 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); Madsen v. United Television, Inc.. 797

Rule 5 8 A

P.2d 1083 (Utah 1990); Alford v. Utah League
of Cities & Towns. 791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.
1990); Govert Copier Painting v. Van
Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990);
Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dalton,
808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991); City Consumer
Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991);
Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991);
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d
242 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. Morton
Thiokol. Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991); Hill v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah
1992); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys' Fees in
Utah. 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553.
Note, The Movant's Burden in a Motion for
Summary Judgment. 1987 Utah L. Rev. 731.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Summary
Judgment §§ 16 to 19, 26 to 36, 41 to 44.
C.J.S. - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 219 to 227.
A
£ * R ' 7 k P r o c e e d m ^ 5 o r summary judgment
rL^ld6136yiPreSe
counterclaim, 8
Reviewability of order denving motion for
summary judgment, 15 A.L.R.3d 899.
Right to voluntarv dismissal of civil action
as affected by opponent's motion for summary
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113.

Dead num's statute, use of evidence exclude
able under, to defeat or support summary judgment, 67 A.L.R.3d 970.
Liability in tort for interference with physic i an > s con tract or relationship with hospital, 7
A ^R 4th S72
Admissibility of oral testimony at state sumj u d g m e n t hearing, 53 A.L.R.4th 527.
S u f f i c i e n c y o f e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t g r m t
s u m

rf

^ judgment in will probate or contest
proceedings. 53 A.L.R.4th o61.
Necessity of oral argument on motion for
su
^mary judgment or judgment on pleadings
in
federal court, 105 A.L.R. Fed 755.
K
*y Numbers. — Judgment «=» 178 to 190.

Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33
of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate.
The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment
and may advance it on the calendar.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 57, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declaratory Judgments §§ 183. 186, 203 et seq.
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155.
A.L.R. — Right to jury trial in action for

declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th
146.
Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment **>
41, 42, 251, 367.

Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.

Rule 58A
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(b) J u d g m e n t in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the
defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs
of entry, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
(d) is intended to remedy the difficulties suggested by Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14
Utah 2d 334, 384 P.2d 109 (1963).
Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a),
F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Judgment against
person dying after verdict or decision, not a
lien on realty, § 78-22-1.1.
Judgment by confession authorized, § 78-223.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Death of party.
—During appeal.
Other cases.
—Unsigned minute entry.
When entered.
—Completion.
Formal judgment.
Notice to parties.
—Filing.
—Unsigned minute entry.
Cited.
Death of party.
—During appeal.
Where jury returned verdict for plaintiff but
judge entered judgment notwithstanding the
verdict for defendant, death of plaintiff during
appeal did not abate appeal since court, under
Subdivision (e) of this rule, could still enter
judgment on verdict if judgment notwithstanding verdict were reversed. Bates v. Burns, 2
Utah 2d 362. 274 P.2d 569 (1954).

Other cases.
—Unsigned minute entry.
An appeal from a summary judgment was
dismissed where the record showed only an
unsigned minute entry and no judgment or order signed by the judge. Wisden v. City of
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985).
When entered.
—Completion.
—-Formal judgment.
Whether plaintiff had right to have action
dismissed upon payment of costs presented judicial question to be determined by court, so
that where court ordered case dismissed and
clerk entered "case dismissed" in register of
actions but formal judgment had not been entered, action was still pending between parties.
Yusky v. Chief Consol. Mining Co., 65 Utah
269, 236 P. 452 (1925).
Notice to parties.
Under this rule, a judgment is complete and
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Cited in National Farmers Union Property
& Cas. Co. v. Thompson. 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d
249 <1955»: Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435.
326 P.2d 722 (1958): Howard v. Howard. 11
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (I960); NunJey v.
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.. 15 Utah 2d 126,
388 P.2d 798 (1964): Hanson v. General Bldrs.
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61
(1964): James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964); Porcupine Reservoir
Co. v. Llovd W. Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318,
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29
Utah 2d 36. 504 P.2d 1003 (1973): Nichols v.
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v.
Wagner. 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com.
Fin. Corp. v. Bnmhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery. 607 P.2d 828
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne,
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622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981): Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981);
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah
198D: Pozzolan Portland Cement Co. v. Gardner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983i; Nelson v.
Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden
Kev Realty. Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah
1985): Estate of Kay. 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah
1985); York v. Unqualified Washington
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah
1986); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah
1987); Fackrell v. Fackrell. 740 P.2d 1318
(Utah 1987»: Walker v. Carlson. 740 P.2d 1372
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schettler. 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989);
Paryzek v. Parvzek. 776 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989): Alired v. Allred. 835 P.2d 974
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial
§S 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191.
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §5 13 et seq.,
115. 116, 122 to 127.
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case,
after expiration of term or time prescribed by
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion
or comments by judge as to compromise or settlement of civil case. 6 A.L.R.3d 1457.
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil
case. 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instructions in civil case as affected by the manner in
which they are written. 10 A.L.R.3d 501.
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by
jury in civil case of scene of accident or premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918.
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15
A.LJUd 1101.
Absence ofjudge from courtroom during trial
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637.
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in

case, or with partner or associate of such attornev, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64
A.L.R.3d 126.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
civil case where jury has been waived or not
demanded by parties. 9 A.L.R.4th 1041.
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170.
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747.
Court reporter's death or disability prior to
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or
new trial. 57 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory
damages for personal injury to or death of seaman in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness —
modern cases. 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541.
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of damages for personal injury or death in actions under Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases. 97 A.L.R. Fed.
189.
Key Numbers. — New Trial c» 13 et seq.,
110, 116.

Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
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(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), i2), (3), or (4), not more than 3
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation./This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relievr-a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these
rules or by an independent action.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 60. F.R.C.P.

Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion
to set aside judgment. § 21-1-5.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

"Any other reason justifying relief.*
—Default judgment.
—Impossibility of compliance with order.
—Incompetent counsel.
—Lack of due process.
—Merits of case.
—Mistake or inadvertence.
—Real party in interest.
Appeals.
Clerical mistakes.
—Computation of damages.
—Correction after appeal.
—Date of judgment.
Void judgment.
—Estate record.
—Inherent power of courts.
—Intent of court and parties.
—Judicial error distinguished.
—Order prepared by counsel.
—Predating of new trial motion.
Court's discretion.
Default judgment.
Effect of set-aside judgment.
—Admissions.
Fraud.
—Divorce action.
Form of motion.
Independent action.
—Constitutionality of taxes.
—Divorce decree.
—Fraud or duress.
-—Motion distinguished.
Invalid summons.
—Amendment without notice.
Inequity of prospective application.
Jurisdiction.
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect.
—Default judgment.
Illness.
Inconvenience.
•
Merits of claim.
•
Negligence of attorney.
No claim for relief.
—Delayed motion for new trial.
—Failure to file cost bill.

—Failure to file notice of appeal.
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings.
—Trial court's discretion.
—Unemployment compensation appeal.
—Workmen's compensation appeal.
Newiy discovered evidence.
—Burden of proof.
—Discretion not abused.
Procedure.
—Notice to parties.
Res judicata.
Reversal of judgment.
—Invalidation of sale.
Satisfaction, release or discharge.
—Accord and satisfaction.
—Discharging representative of estate from
further demand.
—Erroneously included damages.
—Prospective application of judgment.
Timeliness of motion.
—Confused mental condition of party.
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution.
—Fraud.
—Invalid service.
—Judicial error.
—Jurisdiction.
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect.
—Newly discovered evidence.
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption.
—"Reasonable time.**
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion.
—Satisfaction.
Unauthorized appearance.
Void judgment.
—Basis.
—Lack of jurisdiction.
Cited.
"Any other reason justifying relief."
Subdivision (7) embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than
tho*e listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); second, that the reason justify relief; and third,
that the motion be made within a reasonable
time Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 65?
P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982); Richins v. Delben
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. Apo.
1991).

